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FAMILY LAND TRUST
THE FAMILY LAND TRUST TREATED AS
AN ASSOCIATION
FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
CARTER GLAss, III*
Introduction
Owners of undivided interests in real property are frequently con-
fronted with a very realistic and practical business problem brought
about by the complexity of liquidating their interests without an
economic loss and of obtaining an advantageous investment return on
the property during the process of liquidation. Where partition is not
feasible due to the size or nature of the property, current market con-
ditions, or the multitudinous and widespread ownership of the un-
divided interests, the owners must resort to some form of legal entity
to hold, develop and ultimately dispose of the property. In addition
to the business impracticalities of a joint liquidation of such property,
the owners are faced with legal complications attributable to the num-
bers of owners, the different rules of real .property in the various juris-
dictions in which the property may be located, and the necessity of
court action in instances where infants are involved. Quite often the
value of the real property lies in its availability for business or indus-
trial leases, or in underlying oil, gas and various minerals. In such in-
stances, the owners may find that parties previously interested in leas-
ing business sites or purchasing oil and mineral rights are quite cool to
the proposition when they become aware of the prospect of paying
rental or royalties to numerous owners in proportion to their owner-
ship interests, especially if some of the owners are infants.'
Of course, individuals who go into the market and jointly purchase
real property for invesment purposes must be assumed to approach the
transaction with open eyes and with some notice of the future dif-
ficulties, though this is not always true.2 On the other hand, there
is another class of co-owners who have the property thrust upon them
and are placed in the position of co-owners of realty with no volition
on their part. This class is composed of beneficiaries of inter vivos trusts,
heirs of decedents who die intestate, and devisees under wills and
*Member of the Lynchburg, Virginia Bar.
2This was precisely the difficulty which faced the heirs to coal land in Hugh
MacRae Land Trust, 1 T. C. 899 (1943).
2See Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U. S. 369 (1935).
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testamentary trusts. With the increasing prevalence of the trust as a
means of disposing of property by will and the tendency to tie up the
property for a period of time commensurate with the rule against per-
petuities, the day of distribution of the trust corpus often arrives with
remainder beneficiaries numbering in the dozens, owning varying un-
divided interests largely dependent upon the generations they are
removed from the testator's bounty.3
Whatever the source from which the ownership sprang, the basic
nature of the problem is the same, and similar methods have been em-
ployed in an attempt to minimize the burdens of co-ownership.4 How-
ever, since there is a tendency to feel more sympathy for those that are
placed in a questionable legal position not of their own making than
there is for the unwary who reach such a position on their own, this
article is confined to a consideration of co-ownership by inheritance,
and the so-called family land trust.
In seeking a legal entity which is capable of liquidating such real
property, the first considerations are flexibility, simplicity and all the
legal attributes necessary to accomplish the desired end. At first glance
the corporate form appears to be the obvious solution, and it quite
possibly might be were it not for the impact of federal income taxa-
tion. The corporation provides title in one source, centralized man-
agement, security of the enterprise from termination or interruption
by death of the co-owners, transferability of ownership interests with-
out affecting continuity, the introduction of new capital if needed in
the liquidation process, and limitation of personal liability of the
co-owners. This ideal scheme, however, must be viewed with an eye
toward the tax aspects, and when so viewed is found wanting. Not
only is the corporation subject to the federal income tax of 38% of its
net taxable income5 in addition to the individual income tax on the
dividends in the hands of its stockholders, but also it may be classed
as a personal holding company and be required to pay an additional
surtax,0 or be required to pay an additional surtax because of an un-
3For example see Hugh MacRae Land Trust, i T. C. 899 (1943) where the
beneficiaries were 36 in number and were composed of kinships ranging from
children to great-grandchildren.
'For a collection of cases on the broad problem of the federal income tax con-
sequences flowing from the utilization of the trust entity, see Notes 0947) 166
A. L. R. 1461, (1943) 144 A. L. R. 1050, (1937) io8 A. L. R. 340.
rMaximum normal tax 24%, 1. R. C. § § 13 and 14, maximum surtax 14%,
I. R. C. § 15.
I. R. C. § 5oo.
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reasonable accumulation of surplus not distributed to its stockholders.7
Furthermore, of no minor importance is the effect of state income,
franchise, capital stock and a multitude of license taxes imposed upon
corporations, and these, together with various state and federal regu-
latory measures, cannot be overlooked in selecting the corporate form.
Many family groups desiring to liquidate inherited realty have
immediately rejected the idea of incorporation in favor of a partner-
ship or agency. True, most of the danger of increased taxation is avoid-
ed but the legal shortcomings of such arrangements are immediately
apparent. Title and centralized management are vested in one source
but the life of the enterprise is only co-extensive with the death of the
first co-owner. Except for an agency or power of attorney agreement,
coupled with an interest, no agreement of this nature offers certainty
that an interfamily argument will not render the scheme a nullity
through the withdrawal of one or more of the participants. Such a
plan will suffer from the difficulties of selling and assigning interests,
the inability of easily bringing in new capital, and the danger of ab-
solute liability of each co-owner. The death of any party requires the
execution of new agreements, and, if infants or incompetents are in-
volved, requires appropriate court action and the introduction of
guardians, committees and personal representatives into the scheme.8
The entity most frequently resorted to has been the trust, and,
when appropriately framed, it has been the most adequate. If sufficient-
ly broad powers are given the trustee, all of the advantages of the cor-
poration are preserved, such as flexibility, centralization, continuity,
uninterrupted existence, facility of transferring interests and intro-
duction of new capital, and limited liability both as to the bene-
ficiaries and the trustees. In addition, the trust furnishes a testa-
mentary scheme for the ultimate disposition of the income and prin-
cipal to descendants of the original co-owners. But, here again, the im-
pact of federal taxation can materially reduce the effectiveness of the
transaction, where the trust instrument is not carefully framed and
its purpose and powers are very broad. The ordinary trust is taxed at
the same rates applicable to individuals,9 but the most flexible type
of trust, especially the business or Massachusetts trust, has most of the
legal characteristics of a corporation and is likely to be taxed as such.
7I. R. C. § 102.
gThere is the additional possibility that taxation will not be minimized and
the partnership or agency entity might be taxed as a corporaton. See Wabash Oil
and Gas Ass'n v. Commissioner, i6o F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947).
0I. R. C. § 161 (a).
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The Internal Revenue Code provides that "The term 'corporation'
includes associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance com-
panies"'10 and the Treasury Regulations define the word "association"
to include certain types of trusts, and require that they be so taxed."
While it is believed that the statute was aimed by Congress at the busi-
ness type of trusts, the regulations and the decisions have extended
the scope of "association" far beyond this point, until today many
of the conventional or "pure" trusts, including some family land
trusts, are taxed as associations. Therefore, it is imperative that a
careful appraisal be made of the case material before the trust entity
is chosen as the medium for the liquidation of real property acquired
by co-owners from an ancestor.
Development of the Law
The Supreme Court of the United States was first called upon in
Crocker v. Malley' 2 to construe the word "association" to include cer-
tain types of trusts within the contemplation of federal revenue acts.
Under an enactment of 1913, Congress imposed a tax on dividends
received by a taxable corporation from stock which it held in another
corporation.13 The stockholders of a Massachusetts corporation liqui-
dated the enterprise and transferred the corporate property to a Mas-
sachusetts type of business trust, organized to obtain this result. The
property consisted of the fee simple ownership in real estate under
lease and all of the stock of another corporation, a manufacturing con-
cern. The stockholders in turn became beneficiaries of the trust, their
respective interests being represented by transferable trust receipts.
The Court overruled the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and held
that the trust was not a "corporation, joint-stock company or associa-
tion" in the terminology of the statute and did not have to pay a tax
on the dividends it received from the manufacturing corporation. In
reaching its conclusion, the Court found that the purpose of the act
was to discourage holding companies and concentration of power and
wealth, and that Congress was not concerned with the trust situation,
however analogous to a corporation it might be. Its determination on
the facts was based upon the degree of control which was exercised over
"I. R. C. § 3797 (a)(3).
"Reg. 111 § 29.3797-2 as amended by T. D. 5468, Aug. 9, 1945 and Reg. 111
§ 29-3797-3-
12249 U. S. 223 (1918).
"Income Tax Act of October 3, 1913, Chap. 13, § II G(a), 38 Stat. 114-172.
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the legal entity by the owners, and it decided that beneficiaries of
trusts are ". . . not partners in any sense, and when they have no joint
action or interest and no control over the fund"' 4 they cannot be
classed as an association.
Following this case, the Commissioner adopted a series of regula-
tions and rulings to the end that a trust would be treated as an asso-
ciation for federal income taxation where the beneficiaries retained a
voice in the conduct of the business of the trust or control over the
trustees, whether through the right to elect trustees periodically or
otherwise.' 5 These regulations and the cases decided in accordance
therewith thereby adopted the "control test." In instances where the
beneficiaries exercised substantial control, the trust was taxed as an
association. Where the control was insubstantial or incidental to the
exercise of other legitimate trust powers, the trust was taxable at indi-
vidual rates.'
6
The "control test" was destined to have short existence, as the
Supreme Court was again asked to construe the word "association"
as applied to trusts in Hecht v. Malley.17 Congress had imposed an
excise tax for the privilege of doing business, based upon capital stock
value, upon ".. . every corporation, joint-stock company or associa-
tion."18 Three Massachusetts business trusts had been held taxable as
associations by the Commissioner and the three appeals to the Su-
preme Court had been consolidated for hearing. One trust had been
organized by members of the Hecht family and its corpus was com-
posed of real estate inherited by them as tenants in common. The trust
instrument provided for full and complete powers of management in
the trustees to accomplish the business purpose and for transferable
certificates of ownership evidencing the beneficial shares. The other
two trusts were typical business trusts formed to operate businesses
with capital obtained by selling trust shares. The Court decided that
all three trusts were taxable as associations, not because of any de-
gree of control exercised by the beneficiaries, but due to the quasi-
corporation nature of their organization; "... as the petitioners are
u249 U. S. 223, 234 (1918).
"Regs. 45 and 62, Art. 15o4. Additional rulings are set out in Woodrow Lee
Trust v. Commissioner, 17 B. T. A. iog, iii (1929).
"For typical cases see: E. A. Landreth and Co., 15 B. T. A. 655 (1929); Wilkins &
Lange, 15 B. T. A. 1183 (1929).
17265 U. S. 144 (1923).
"Revenue Act of September 8, 1916, 39 Stat. 756 Chap. 463, and Revenue Act
of 1918, 40 Stat. 1o57, Chap. 18.
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not merely trustees for collecting funds and paying them over, but are
associated together in much the same manner as the directors in a
corporation for the purpose of carrying on business enterprises, the
trusts are to be deemed associations."'19
Notwithstanding the apparent repudiation of the "control test"
by the Court in the Hecht case, after this decision the Commissioner
adopted new regulations containing two alternatives, providing in
brief that a trust would be treated as an association either where the
beneficiaries retained positive control over the trust or where the trust
was an association together of trustees in a similar manner to directors
of a corporation for the purpose of carrying on business enterprise.20
The commission was sustained in this action by the lower court de-
cisions and the two alternative tests of "control"and "business pur-
pose" became firmly implanted in the law."21
The Supreme Court expressed no further opinion in this matter
for twelve years, during which interim the lower court decisions showed
a complete lack of harmony in applying the tests to given factual situa-
tions. However, in 1935 the Court handed down a new doctrinal con-
cept and basic principles of determination in Morrissey v. Commis-
sioner22 and applied these principles to three divergent factual cases
in Swanson v. Commissioner,23 Helvering v. Combs, 24 and Helvering
v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates.25 All four of these cases involved the de-
termination of whether a trust was an association for purposes of fed-
eral income taxation under the definition: "The term 'corporation' in-
cludes associations, joint-stock companies and insurance companies. ' 26
The Morrissey case was concerned with a real estate trust formed
by two individuals for the purpose of developing, renting and selling
a golf club and adjoining residential property and for investing the pro-
ceeds. The trust instrument gave broad business powers to the trustees
who were not subject to control by the beneficiaries. In addition, it
provided for transferable shares, both common and preferred, which
"265 U. S. 144, 161 (1923).
2°Reg. 65 Art. 1504 as amended by T. D. 3748 IV-2 C. B. 7.
"For typical cases see: Jackson-Wermick Trust, 24 B. T. A. 150 (1931); Fred
T. Murphy et al, Trustees, 25 B. T. A. 724 (1932) non-acquiescence C. B. June 1932,
p. io.
22296 U_ S_ 344 (1935).
2 296 U. S. 362 (195).
2'296 U. S. 365 (1935).
25296 U- S. 369 (1935)-
"Appearing in the Revenue Act of 1924 § 2 (a)(2), 43 Stat. 253, Chap. 234 and
each subsequent revenue act, now contained in I. R. C. § 3797 (a)(3).
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were to be sold to the general public, limited liability of beneficiaries
and trustees, continuity on the death of any party, and a fixed trust
life of 25 years terminable by the trustees. The Court found the trust
was taxable as an association because it was organized for business in
a manner analogous to a corporation and in fact operated as a business.
It emphasized certain characteristics of the trust as the determining
factor: The trustees operated a business in accordance with broad
trust powers; transferable shares were issued rather than normal trust
beneficial interests; the trust instrument provided for centralized
control, continuity and limited liability. The Court minimized the
fact that none other than the original property was acquired by the
trustees, in the light of the business purposes of the trust.
As a matter of policy, the Morrissey case discussed in quite some de-
tail the basic differences between an ordinary "pure" trust and a busi-
ness trust taxable at corporate rates. In the ordinary trust, the object is
to hold and conserve particular property, with incidental powers; "But
the nature and purpose of the cooperative undertaking will differen-
tiate it from an ordinary trust."27 Thus, the business trust is a joint en-
terprise, the object of which is to provide a medium for the conduct
of business and the sharing of its gains. From a practical approach,
the Court pointed out that corporate characteristics are important but
made clear that it is resemblance not identity which is controlling.
The Court considered the following elements as indicating a corpora-
tion rather than a trust, none of which alone was considered decisive
or indispensable:
i. Statutory or common law form of corporation utilized.
2. A body of persons united for a common enterprise.
3. Use of particular corporate methods, forms or terminology.
4. Trustees functioning in the same manner as officers and direc-
tors, with broad powers.
5. A trust instrument similar to a corporate charter or by-laws.
6. Control by the beneficiaries or meetings and elections of their
representatives.
7. Facility of transferring beneficial interests and transferability
by negotiation rather than assignment by deed.
8. Formal evidence of ownership-i.e., trust certificates.
9. Continuity of control, uninterrupted by death of beneficiaries.
io. Title in the trustees.
r,'296 U. S. 344, 357 (935)-
1t9491
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1 i. Centralized management.
12. Self-perpetuation of the trustees or perpetuation by the bene-
ficiaries.
13. Large numbers of participants, and facility for the introduction
of new capital.
14. Limitation of liability of the participants or of the trustees.
In the Swanson case two joint owners of an apartment building
transferred the building in trust, apparently to facilitate renting of
the building. The trust instrument gave broad powers to the trustees
to lease, manage, improve, sell and invest and provided for assignable
trust receipts, limited liability of the beneficiaries and the trustees,
continuity unaffected by death of any party, and limitation of the life
of the trust to an ascertainable date or within the trustees' discretion.
In operation, the trustees never exercised their broad powers but acted
through a firm of real estate agents of which the settlors were owners,
in accordance with a clause in the trust instrument. No formal corpor-
ate forms or procedures were employed but a few trust receipts were
actually sold and transferred upon a written registry of beneficiaries.
The Court held that the trust was taxable as an association on the basis
of the Morrissey case. It was not impressed by the fact that the number
of beneficiaries was limited, that no additional property was ever ac-
quired, that the trust had a limited life span, and that the trust never
performed in a formal sense like a corporation, because these facts
did not alter the basic nature and purpose of the undertaking as a
common business enterprise.
In the Combs case, an owner of oil land transferred the property
in trust for the purpose of financing, leasing and drilling an oil well.
The trust instrument created transferable trust receipts which were
sold and issued to thirteen beneficiaries. The trustees were given broad
powers co-extensive with the purpose of developing the oil well and
were protected through limited liability. As it turned out, the trust
was of short duration as the trustees first leased and then sold the oil
interests and the trust ceased in accordance with its terms. During its
short existence the trust employed no corporate forms or methods.
The Court found the trust taxable as an association by analogy and
stated: "Entering into a joint undertaking they avoided the character-
istic responsibilities of partners and secured advantages analogous to
those which pertain to corporate organization." 28 The Court empha-
1296 U. S. 365, 368 (1935).
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sized that the trust was akin to a corporation in that it provided cen-
tralized management, continuity, limited liability and transferability
of beneficial interests. It deprecated the importance of the lack of
control in the beneficiaries, the absence of particular forms of cor-
porate procedure, and the fact that only one oil well was contemplated
or actually involved.
The Coleman-Gilbert case interjects a new element of basic policy
into the picture with relation to the binding effect of the trust in-
strument insofar as it establishes the purpose of the trust. Here, five
individuals were co-owners of twenty rental apartment houses. They
transferred the property in trust (to themselves as trustees), making
themselves beneficiaries, and giving the trustees broad powers to deal
with the property, including the power to reinvest proceeds and to
withhold or distribute income. The instrument provided for the is-
suance of transferable beneficial shares, limited liability of trustees
and beneficiaries, perpetuation of the trustees as a continuing body
and a life span of fifteen years unless the property was sold sooner and
the proceeds distributed. The evidence showed that the individuals as
trustees operated the property through an office staff in essentially the
same manner as they had done prior to the execution of the trust
agreement. Oral testimony was introduced to the effect that the indi-
viduals as co-owners had experienced difficulty in operating the prop-
erty and had seized upon the trust form as an advantageous method of
liquidating the property at an appropriate time and on a favorable
market.
The Court decided, under the doctrine of the Morrissey case, that
the trust was taxable as an association as its purpose was to operate a
business as evidenced by the broad powers given to the trustees in the
instrument and their actual business activities in accordance there-
with. The co-owners, in the language of the Court, "... formed a com-
bination to conduct the business of holding, improving and selling
real estate, with provision for management through representatives,
with continuity which was not to be disturbed by death or changes
in ownership of beneficial interests and with limited liability."29 The
Court found additional support for its position in the fact that the
co-owners conducted the business in much the same fashion after the
trust was formed as before, and this fact indicated that the purpose was
broader than an effort to avoid partition. As in previous cases, the
Court again minimized the importance of the lack of formal legal con-
"296 U. S. 369, 374 (1935)-
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trol in the beneficiaries and the absence of corporate methods and pro-
cedure.30 In addition, the Court was little concerned with the small
number of participants in the enterprise, stressing the fact that closed
corporations are frequently formed with as few as one stockholder; nor
was the Court concerned with the fact that the enterprise was confined
to the management and improvement of real estate, for it pointed out
that investment in real property can be a business as well as the invest-
ment in tangible or intangible personalty.
Much of that which is given is pure dicta and was used as argu-
ment by the Court to bolster its conclusion already reached in the
light of the broad language used in the trust instrument. The Court
was apparently not convinced by the oral testimony of the co-owners
that the trust was formed to avoid partition and to liquidate the prop-
erty, and felt that the parties were bound by the terms of the instru-
ment and could not introduce contradictory testimony. From the ex-
tensive powers given to the trustees, the formal composition of the
trust and the methods of operation set forth in the trust instrument,
the Court found that the purpose of the endeavor was to operate a
business. In the ruling that "The parties are not at liberty to say that
their purpose was other or narrower than that which they formally
set forth in the instrument under which their activities were con-
ducted,"'1 the Court laid down a policy which has a tendency to re-
strict the employment of traditional stereotyped forms of trust instru-
ments, wherein numerous powers are given to the trustees with no
expectation that they will ever be needed or exercised.
In only one other case has the Supreme Court considered the cor-
porate taxability of the trust. In Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner 2 the
taxpayer met with success for the first time since the Crocker case. The
taxpayer owned a large tract of residential property, which, in order
to facilitate sale, had to be improved, subdivided and sold off in lots.
He executed contemporaneously a trust agreement and an agency con-
tract. The land was transferred in trust (for the benefit of the settlor
and the real estate agent) and the trustee was given limited power to
execute contracts and conveyances of individual lots at the direction
of a real estate agent and to make collection of payments after the
initial payments. The instrument specified transferable certificates of
-"It was on this last point that the Circuit Court based its opinion sustaining
the taxpayer. 76 F. (2d) 191 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1934).
1296 U. S. 369, 374 (935).
*23o U. S. 385 (1936).
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ownership but none were ever issued. The agency contract constituted
the real estate agent an exclusive agency to improve, subdivide and
negotiate sales of lots and to accept the initial payments. The Court
held that the trust was not analogous to an association and distin-
guished the Morrissey case on the basis that this was an ordinary or
"pure" trust for a limited purpose, and stated: "There is simply the
common relation of principal and agent, coupled with the collateral
incidents of an ordinary trust." 33 The Court found the following ele-
ments common to traditional trusts and to the particular trust under
consideration:
i. Designation of particular property in trust with no power to in-
crease the holding.
2. Limitation of the powers of the trustee to the end desired.
3. Limitation of the purpose of the trust to accomplish specific
results, and not to operate a business.
4. Definitely named persons as beneficiaries rather than indefinite
body of certificate holders.
5. The duties of the trustee are essentially ministerial with only
those incidental powers necessary to accomplish the limited and spe-
cific purpose.
7. No association of individuals but rather an enterprise created
by one individual for the benefit of himself or others.
The Court very strongly emphasized that the trust had been
formed by a single individual and not by two or more persons, and
that consequently there was no association, joint-enterprise, or com-
bination and no planning of a common effort. If it be true as it ap-
pears from the opinion that the Court was influenced by this factor,
this represents a departure from the Coleman-Gilbert case where the
Court stressed that the number of participants was immaterial. Furth-
ermore, the Court apparently backed down somewhat from the propo-
sition in the Coleman-Gilbert case to the effect that the trust instru-
ment is controlling on the purpose of the trust, in pointing out that
while this trust instrument provided for the issuance of transferable
certificates of ownership, none in fact were issued. Surely, the provision
in the trust for transferable certificates contemplates a shifting body
of beneficiaries and the introduction of new capital, and thus indi-
cates an original purpose broader than a "pure" trust, regardless of
subsequent developments. In view of the above, it is the opinion of the
"o U. S. 385, 389 (1936).
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writer that the Lewis & Co. case has at least by implication toned down
the effect of the Coleman-Gilbert case on these points.
The doctrinal concepts and language of the foregoing cases form
the basis of the present Treasury Regulation and determine the fed-
eral government's policy with regard to taxing of trusts as associations.
In a regulation dealing with the nature of an association, the Com-
missioner defines an "association" as an organization characteristic of
a corporation in its broadest sense regardless of the technical legal
nature of the organization and of the form of the instrument creating
it.34 In a second regulation, the Commissioner points out the essential
differences between a "pure" trust and one taxable as an association.35
This latter regulation provides that the nature and purpose of the
undertaking, as gathered from the instrument itself, differentiates the
two types of trusts, without regard to the actual manner of operation,
the degree of control in the beneficiaries, or the size of the undertak-
ing. The employment of particular corporate forms or methods is an
important consideration in finding a business purpose but is in no
sense essential. If title is transferred to a trustee as a medium to con-
duct business with a view toward income or profit, as a substitute for
a corporation and in order to obtain corporate advantages without its
disadvantages, the entity is treated as an association. On the other
hand, an ordinary trust, whether created by an outsider or the bene-
ficiaries themselves, formed to protect or conserve property, without
any undertaking not strictly necessary to reach this end, will retain
its identity as a trust.
Elements to Consider
As previously pointed out, the Coleman-Gilbert case laid down a
rule that the trust instrument determined the purpose of the trust,
without any reference to the actual manner of operation, and the
Lewis & Co. case cast some doubt upon this proposition. A perusal
of the lower Court decisions clearly indicates that confusion exists as
to the extent the terms of the instrument are controlling. The rule was
rejected by the Sixth Circuit in the case of Commissioner v. Gibbs-
Preyer Trusts Nos. i & 2,36 where two family land trusts were formed
by heirs of a decedent. The trust indenture gave the trustees broad
powers of a business nature, including the power to sell, rent or rein-
vest. The beneficiaries retained control over the trustees, and provision
44Reg. I i, § 29.3797-2 as amended by T. D. 5468, Aug. 9, 1945.
*Reg. 111, § 29.3797-3.
8117 F. (2d) 61g (C. C. A. 6th, 1941),
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was made for negotiable trust receipts (later changed by an amend-
ment), some of which were actually transferred. The evidence showed
that the trustees' activities were, in fact, limited, in conformity to an
oral understanding, to the holding of legal title, the payment of taxes
and maintenance and insurance costs, and the signing of leases at the
direction of the beneficiaries.
The Court decided that the trust was not taxable as an association
because it did not operate as a business despite the opportunity to do
so under the terms of the trust: "The crucial test in determining
whether a trust is an association taxable as a corporation, must be
found in what the trustees actually do and not in the existence of
long unused powers."37 It felt that Congress did not intend to apply
corporate tax rates in every instance where persons associated them-
selves together for the purpose of engaging in business for profit. Con-
gress intended, according to the Court, to balance the corporate and
"pure" trust similarities, and only where the business trust was con-
stituted after the method and form of a corporation, with its economic
advantages, was it to be considered an "association." The Court's po-
sition was somewhat weakened by the fact that it stressed the lack of
technical corporate procedures and the absence of limited liability with
regard to the trust under consideration. Nevertheless, its basic princi-
ple is sound and receives support from other lower Court decisions,
in one of which the Commissioner acquiesced.
38
On the contrary, a numerical majority of the decisions have fol-
lowed the Coleman-Gilbert case on this point and have based their
determination that the trust was taxable as an association on the ex-
istence of broad powers in the trust instrument, irrespective of the
fact that the trust was organized for a more limited purpose and the
broad powers were never exercised. Typical of these cases is Sherman
v. Commissioner,39 where thirteen heirs of a decedent as joint owners
27"l7 F. (2d) 619, 622 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
2sUnited States v. Davidson, 115 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 6th, 1940); Myers v. Com-
missioner, 89 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); Main Street Bank v. Nee, 75 F. Supp.
597 (D. C. Mo. 1948), reversing 72 F. Supp. 922 (D. C. Mo. 1947); Pieroni Building
Trust, 45 B. T. A. 157 (1941); Living Fund Trust, 36 B. T. A. 161 (1937); Girard
Trust Co. Trustee, 34 B. T. A. lo66 (1936); Estate of Herman Becker, para. 43,311
P-H Memo. T. C. (1943). See also the lower court opinion in Gibbs-Preyer Trusts,
39 B. T. A. 492 (1939), and the following decisions rendered prior to the Coleman-
Gilbert case: Commissioner v. Guitar Trust Estate, 72 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1934);
Commissioner v. McCormick, 68 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Willis v. Com-
missioner, 58 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Gardiner v. U. S., 49 F, (2d) 922 (C.
C. A. st, 1931); Fisk v. U. S., 6o F. (2d) 665 (D. C. Mas. 1932),
8 146 F. (2d) 219 (C. C. A, Oth, 1944).
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of a single piece of rental property, transferred the property in trust
in order to avoid partition and the consequent economic loss. Broad
powers were given to the trustees, transferable beneficial interests were
employed, and the trust was terminable only by consent of the bene-
ficiaries. In actual practice, the trustees limited their activities to leas-
ing the property, collecting rents, paying the carrying charges and dis-
tributing the income of the beneficiaries. The Court held that the
trust was taxable at corporate rates, as it was organized for "doing
business."
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the Morrissey case
and stated: "The purpose of the trust is found in the instrument which
created it. The parties are not at liberty to say that it had a different
or narrower purpose."40 The Court felt that the purpose so found was
not restricted by the fact that the activities of the trustees ".... were
confined to the collection and distribution of rents, payment of taxes,
bookkeeping and other incidental duties."141 It is interesting to note
that this decision was rendered by the same Circuit Court, the Sixth,
that rendered the opinion in the Gibbs-Preyer case, without overruling
or distinguishing the previous case. Whether the Court disbelieved the
taxpayer's testimony as to the actual purpose of the trust, or was
changing its position on this point is speculative. In either event its
end result finds adequate support and offers a danger signal to framers
of trust instruments.42 An interesting additional possibility is given
in Frederick Pitzman et al, Trustees, 43 to the effect that broad powers
are proper where they are restricted in the trust instrument to accom-
plish a limited and specific purpose. However, no other case has been
found on this point and the decision should be regarded with caution.
Assuming for the moment that no objection is made as to the scope
of the purpose and powers of the trust as contained in the trust in-
strument, the logical problem is then one of the nature of the limited
trust purposes which are acceptable to the Courts as indicative of a
40 146 F. (2d) 219, 227 (C. C. A. 6th, x944).
41146 F. (2d) 219, 227 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944).
42For additional cases on this point see: National Metropolitan Bank v. Com-
missioner, 145 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944); Sears v. Hassett, iii F. (2d) 961
(C. C. A. ist, 1940); Marshall's Heirs v. Commissioner, iii F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 3 d,
1940); Commissioner v. Vandegrift R. & Inv. Co., 82 F. (2d) 387 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1936);
Hill v. Reynolds, 75 F. Supp. 408 (D. C. Minn. 1948); W. P. Halliday, 38 B. T. A.
518 (1938); Joseph C. Grew, para. 48,153 P-H Memo. T. C. (1948); Estate of Cort-
landt Parker, para. 43,415 P-H Memo. T. C. (1943). See also the lower court
opinion in National Metropolitan Bank, para. 43,497 P-H Memo. T. C. (1943).
1336 B. T. A. 81 (1937)-
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"pure" or traditional type of trust. The Coleman-Gilbert case indi-
cates, in a rather left handed way, that if the trust is formed for the
purpose of liquidating property, in order to avoid the necessity of
partition, it will not be taxed as an association. This proposition is
sustained by a number of cases, outstanding among them being Girard
Trust Co., Trustee.44 Here, nine heirs owning undivided interests in
undeveloped residential land, transferred it in trust in order to effect
a liquidation of the property. The court found that the enterprise
was a "pure" trust because it was created as the most convenient and
practical method of disposing of the property. It considered the prac-
tical aspects of the situation in emphasizing that subdivision was the
only feasible method of handling the property, as the estate was too
large for the market to be promptly liquidated, and to have deeds exe-
cuted by all interested individuals would be too cumbersome. The
Court rejected the contention of the Commissioner that the profit mo-
tive changed the situation and turned the trust into a business enter-
prise.
While the Court in the Girard Trust case was not concerned with
the lengthy period of liquidation, other cases have reached a different
conclusion. In Joseph C. Grew45 the Court, in holding the trust taxable
as an association, was greatly impressed by the fact that the trust had
not been liquidated in the 33 years since its creation. Probably the
correct approach is that found in Frederick Pitzman et al, Trustees4 6
where the court emphasized that the land had to be disposed of slowly
due to its utility only for industrial sites, and stated that the nature
of the property must be balanced against the period of liquidation in
determining whether the actual purpose of the trust is liquidation or
operation of a business.
Most family land trusts have been formed to liquidate the property,
but quite frequently they have an additional purpose, or a sole pur-
"34 B. T. A. 1o66 (1936). To the same effect see: Soloman v. Commissioner, 89
F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); Commissioner v. Vandegrift R. & Inv. Co., 82 F.
(2d) 387 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936); Commissioner v. Morriss R. Co. Trust No. 2, 68 F.
(2d) 648 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Willis v. Commissioner, 58 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 9 th,
1932); Blair v. Wilson Syndicate Trust, 39 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 5th, 193o); Main
Street Bank v. Nee, 75 F. Supp. 597 (D. C. Mo. 1948), reversing 72 F. Supp. 922
(D. C. Mo. 1947); Fisk v. U. S., 6o F. (2d) 665 (D. C. Mass. 1932); W. P. Halliday,
38 B. T. A. 518 (1938); Estate of Hermann Becker, para. 43,311 P-H Memo. T. C.
(1943). See also lower court opinion in Roberts-Soloman Trust Estate, 34 B. T. A.
723 (1936).
"Para. 48,153 P-H Memo. T. C. (1948). See also Helvering v. Washburn, 99 F.
(2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) where "immediate" liquidation was stressed.
1036 B. T. A. 81 (1937)"
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pose, of conserving and protecting the property for the benefit of
future generations. As previously shown, this object is approved by the
regulations and draws additional support from the cases. In Myers
v. Commissioner,41 three brothers jointly inherited a single parcel of
real estate from their father. They found it impossible to liquidate
the property and were afraid that the death of any one of them and
the consequent introduction of minor children into the picture would,
in the long run, result in a loss to the family. Therefore, they trans-
ferred the property in trust for a term of twenty years in order to con-
serve the property until their minor children became of age. Even
though the powers given to the trustee were broad, the Court held
that the trust was not taxable at corporate rates because it had been
organized for conservation rather than business.
In Estate of Cortlandt Parker4s the Court held to the contrary in
a rather strained opinion. Eight children and grandchildren of the
decedent inherited an undivided interest in real and personal property.
In order to preserve the property it was transferred in trust for the
joint lives of the settlors. The trust instrument gave broad powers
to the trustee and specifically provided that beneficial interests could
be assigned only by deed. The trustees leased part of the property,
sold off some lots, bought adjoining property as a protective measure,
and invested proceeds in stocks and bonds. The Court held that the
trust was a business both in purpose and in operation as "Its avowed
purpose was to hold the properties of the estate for income produc-
tion."49 In interpreting the Morrissey case, the Court decided that the
".. . fact that petitioner may have been organized principally for the
purpose of conserving the assets of decedent's estate would not neces-
sarily relieve it from tax liability as an association. Such a trust might
still have all the essential characteristics of an association as defined
by the Courts." 50
The liquidation or conservation of property are rather broad pur-
poses in themselves and it necessarily follows that more limited pur-
poses do not carry the stigma of "association." Thus, the cases have ap-
4789 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), appeal dismissed 95 F. (2d) io1 (1938). See
in addition: Paine v. U. S., 32 F. Supp. 672 (D. C. Mass. 1940); Pieroni Building
Trust, 45 B. T. A. 157 (1941); Living Fund Trust, 36 B. T. A. 161 (1937); Magoon
Trust Estate, para. 42,4o6 P-H Memo. T. C. (1942).
"Para. 43,415 P-H Memo. T. C. 0943). See additional cases: Sears v. Hassett, 111
F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940); Joseph C. Grew, para. 48,153 P-H Memo. T. C (1948).
4'Para. 43,415, p. 43-1330 P-H Memo. T. C.
"Para. 43415, p. 4-31330 P-H Memo. T. C.
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proved various objects to be attained where the trust powers have
been restricted to this end: The renting and distribution of rents on
behalf of a cumbersome group of co-owners; 51 the leasing and dis-
posing of coal rights in order to avoid the difficulties of negotiating
separate and multiple leases; 52 the foreclosing of numerous defaulted
mortgages and selling the jointly owned assets; 53 the financing of real
estate loans as a substitute for mortgages;5 4 and the lending of money
and extension of credit.55 However, care must be taken in drafting
the trust instrument in order that this limited end will be apparent
to the Court.56
It has been previously pointed out that the operation of a business
is not generally considered a legitimate end of a "pure" trust. At the
same time, the cases sustain the proposition that incidental powers
may be given to the trustee to enable him to attain the limited and
specific result desired.57 At least one case has gone much further and
has put its stamp of approval upon a trust that actually operated a
business. In Commissioner v. Guitar Trust Estate5s real and personal
property, including a going business, was transferred in trust. The
Court based its opinion upon the "control" test and held that since
the beneficiaries had no legal right to control the trustees and did not
in fact exercise any control, the trust was not taxable as an association.
The Court minimized the broad powers in the trustees which en-
abled them to operate the business, on the ground that power to op-
erate a going business was a normal trust provision.
The Guitar case was decided prior to the Morrissey case and must
be considered in the light of subsequent developments. While the
"control" test is no longer applied and some decisions have repudiated
uState National Bank of El Paso, Texas v. U. S., 55 F. Supp. 457 (D. C. Tex.
1944); Wyman Building Trust, 45 B. T. A. 155 (1941).
OHugh MacRae Land Trust, i T. C. 899 (1943).
63Broadway-Brompton" Buildings Liquidation Trust, 34-B. T. A. 1089 (1936).
5 Cleveland Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o),
cert. den. 312 U. S. 704 (1941).
'zCommissioner v. McCormick, 68 F. (2d) 653 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
5in Hill v. Reynolds, 75 F. Supp. 408 (D. C. Minn. 1948) the trust was formed
to comply with the Hepburn Act, 49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1 et seq., but the Court felt that
this was not apparent from the instrument; and in National Metropolitan Bank
v. Commissioner, 145 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944) the Court denied that the
trust was organized for charitable purposes.
5'Sears v. Hassett, iii F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Commissioner v. Morriss
R. Co. Trust No. 2, 68 F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); Blair v. Wilson Syndicate
Trust, 39 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); Girard Trust Co., Trustee, 34 B. T. A. io66
(1936); Estate of Cordandt Parker, para. 43415 P-H Memo. T. C. (1943).
"72 F. (2d) 544 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
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the Guitar case, 59 it is to be noted that the Court did not confine its
conclusion to the "control" test but in addition emphasized the lack
of resemblance between the trust and a corporation and the probable
underlying restrictive purpose of liquidation, specifically approved
in Blair v. Wilson Syndicate Trust ° and later decisions. 61 In addition,
it is significant that the Guitar trust was again approved in a recent
decision. In Guitar Trust Estate62 the Court refused to reverse the
previous ruling as to the trust, for later income tax years, simply be-
cause the beneficiaries had failed to withdraw their distributable shares
of the trust income and this accumulation had been reinvested. How-
ever, the Court seemed largely concerned with fair play: "We are
satisfied that an orderly and equal administration of the revenue-col-
lecting function requires that the determination of this case be con-
trolled by ... "63 previous decisions.
It is somewhat difficult to determine what elements or character-
istics of a trust are important in weighing its likeness to a "pure" trust
and to a corporation because many of the cases are inconsistent and
others minimize certain elements in order to strengthen their conclu-
sion already reached. Nevertheless, at least one or more cases have
emphasized the following facts as indicative of a "pure" trust: The
limitation of the property held to the original property with no pow-
er to reinvest proceeds; 64 confining the property to real estate; 65 no
provision for, or issuance of, transferable beneficial shares;66 no ex-
emption from personal liability on the part of the beneficiaries or
trustees; 67 an association together of heirs of decedents rather than
strangers; 8 a short definite trust existence; 69 no technical corporate
'See for example: Commissioner v. Vandegrift R. & Inv. Co., 82 F. (2d) 387
(C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
039 F. (2d) 43 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
"See footnote 44.
"Para. 42,688 P-H Memo. T. C. (1942). The case also came up again on another
point in 34 B. T. A. 857 (1936).
63Para. 42,688, p. 42-688 P-H Memo. T. C.
uState National Bank of El Paso, Texas v. U. S., 55 F. Supp. 457 (D. C. Tex. 1944);
Fisk v. U. S., 6o F. (2d) 665 (D. C. Mass. 1932); Wyman Building Trust, 45 B. T. A.
155 (1941).
"'Fisk v. U. S., 6o F. (2d) 665 (D. C. Mass. 1932). See also dissent in Marshall's
Heirs v. Commissioner, i i F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
I'Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner, 3o U. S. 385 (1936).
6'Commissioner v. Gibbs-Preyer Trusts Nos. I & 2, 117 F. (2d) 619 (C. C. A. 6th,
1941).
6Fisk v. U. S., 6o F. (2d) 665 (D. C. Mass. 1932).
"Wyman Building Trust, 45 B. T. A. 155 (941).
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procedures provided for or employed;70 the limited scope of the trus-
tees actual activities;71 and the limited number of beneficial owners.72
On the other side of the ledger, cases have stressed the following ele-
ments as analogous to a corporation and decided that the trust under
consideration was taxable as an association: The large amount of
property involved and right to increase the holding;73 the right to
issue transferable shares and bring in new capital;74 the large number
of participants in the enterprise; 75 the exemption from personal lia-
bility;76 the conduct of the enterprise in essentially the same manner
after the trust was formed;77 and the lengthy duration of the trust,
even after the original property is sold or exchanged.78
Conclusion
It is the opinion of the writer that the trust form is the most flexible
and adaptable legal entity to accomplish the liquidation of jointly
owned family property and to conserve the property during the period
of liquidation. However, the danger of federal income taxation re-
quires careful planning and execution of the trust. Prior to draft-
ing the trust instrument, consideration must be given to the cases
and allied material in order to ascertain whether the trust as contem-
plated will accomplish tax minimization. 79 The draftsman must realize
that it will be necessary to sacrifice many of the broad powers ordinari-
"'Myers v. Commissioner, 89 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); Gardiner v. U. S., 49
F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. Ist, 1931).
7Gardiner v. U. S., 49 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. Ist, 1931); Fisk v. U. S., 6o F. (2d)
665 (D. C. Mass. 1932).
7-Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner, 3oi U. S. 385 (1936); United States v. Davidson,
115 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o); Blair v. Wilson Syndicate Trust, 39 F. (2d) 43 (C.
C. A. 5 th, 193o); Living Fund Trust, 36 B. T. A. 161 (1937), acquiescence 1937-2
C. B. 17; Estate of Herman Becker, para. 43, 311 P-H Memo. T. C. (1943).
"Willis v. Commissioner, 58 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932); Joseph C. Grew,
para. 48,153 P-H Memo. T. C. (1948).
7'Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U. S. 344 (1935).
r U. S. v. Homecrest Tract, 16o F. (2d) 15o (C. C. A. 9th, 1947).
"'National Metropolitan Bank v. Commissioner, 145 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 4th,
1944). See also the lower Court's opinion, National Metropolitan Bank, para. 43,
497 P-H Memo. T. C. (1943).
7Titus v. U. S., 150 F. (2d) 508 (C. C. A. ioth, 1945); Marshall's Heirs v. Com-
missioner, iii F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
'Sears v. Hassett, iii F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
OThought should also be given as to whether one or several trusts are needed.
However, in this connection the danger that several trusts together might be taxed
as an association should not be overlooked. See: McKean v. Scofield, io8 F. (2d)
764 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1940); Magoon Trust Estate, para. 42,406 P-H Memo. T. C. (1943).
1949]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
ly given to the trustee. This omission is not likely to be serious and
should not affect the efficient operation of the trust. For, after all, the
purpose of the trust must be narrow, with only such powers placed
in the trustees as are indispensable to its ultimate end. It should be
borne in mind that the Court will likely look first to the scope of the
trust instrument in order to ascertain whether the entity is a "pure"
trust or an "association."
As an aid to the trust draftsman, but with no attempt to predict
the vagaries of Court decision, it is suggested that an instrument drawn
in accordance with the following pattern would achieve recognition
as a "pure" trust:
i. The purpose of the trust must be set forth in the trust instru-
ment. It should be specific and narrow, and not vague or broad. If
consistent with the ultimate aim, elect between liquidation and con-
servation, or in other words, selling and renting, and do not attempt
to accomplish both.
2. The powers given to the trustee should be restricted to those
which are strictly necessary to attain the desired end. Eliminate tra-
ditional or stereotyped powers such as "to deal with the property as
an individual." The trustee in no event should have the power to re-
invest proceeds from the sale of property, to use income received in
rental to invest in other property, to exercise discretion as to the dis-
tribution of income, or to operate a going business.
3. The instrument should not provide for any forms or procedures
analogous to the corporation, such as certificates of ownership or trust
receipts, control over the trust by the beneficiaries, exemption from
personal liability, suing or being sued as an entity, or perpetuation of
the trustees. The supervision of the trust should be left to the appro-.
priate state Courts.
4. The trust's life should be restricted to a definite, short period,
and, if feasible, its corpus composed of a limited amount of one class
of property-i.e., a single tract of real property, with the property
specifically enumerated in the trust instrument, together with a pro-
vision prohibiting the acquisition of additional property. In addition,
the beneficiaries should be named and, if at all possible, limited in
number.
The criterion of success is simplicity in the composition of the
trust and a minimum of actual activity on the part of the trustee. Any
attempt to obtain all of the advantages of the corporation will result
in achieving as well its most obvious disadvantage, multiple taxation.
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